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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GRAYCE HURD, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Lloyd I. Hurd, Deceased
and GRAYCE HURD, Personally, ]
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
vs.
LEWELLYN J. SHERMAN and
CONNIE SHERMAN,

I
i

Defendants/Appellants.

Court of Appeals No. 970202CA
Civil No: 940600001

]

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

I.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is properly before this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. 578-2-2(4) (Supp. 1996) and §78-2a-3(2)(j), and pursuant
to Rule App. P. 3.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Whether

plaintiff,

Grayce

Hurd,

as

personal

representative of the Estate of Lloyd Hurd, can bring and maintain
an action against the defendants, and whether the Estate of Lloyd
Hurd

itself

can

bring

and

maintain

an

action

against

the

defendants.
1.

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard.

See Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d

138 (Utah App. 1989).
B.

Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that a

constructive trust had been created for the benefit of plaintiff.
1.

Standard of Review

Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.

Scharf v.

BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
C.

Whether the trial court erred when it found there was no

consideration

for the quitclaim deed, the checks and vehicle

titles.
1.

Standard of Review

The standard of review is whether the finding is clearly
erroneous.
D.

Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987).

Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that all

of the property should be immediately returned to the plaintiff.
1.

Standard of Review

Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.

Scharf v.

BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
E.

Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to

prove the plaintiffs' claims.
1.

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard.

Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d 138

(Utah App. 1989).
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this case.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant's appeal from a final Judgment and Order of the

Sixth Judicial District Court, Kane County, State of Utahf entered
2

by the Honorable David L. Mower.
bench

trial

on

April

4,

1996.

The Order was entered after a
The

Court

ordered

that

a

constructive trust created by the parties was terminated, and that
the items transferred to the defendants or either of them, as
constructive trustees, shall be delivered to the plaintiff Grayce
Hurd within a ten (10) day period from the date of the Court's
Order.

In addition, plaintiff was given judgment against the

defendants for the sum of $20,000.00 for funds taken by defendants
and for costs.
B.

See Appellant's Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties to this action are Grayce Hurd hereinafter

referred to as "Grayce" individually and Grayce Hurd as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Lloyd I. Hurd.

The deceased is

hereinafter referred to as "Lloyd". The defendants are Lewellyn J.
Sherman, hereinafter referred to as "Lewellyn" and Connie Sherman,
hereinafter referred to as "Connie".

Grayce is the mother of

defendant Lewellyn and mother-in-law of defendant Connie.
References are made in this statement to admitted exhibits and
the indexed record numbered by the District Clerk.

In addition,

references to testimony of witnesses are made to the reporter's
transcript identified as "Tr." followed by the page and "L."
designating the lines of the testimony.
Lloyd and Grayce commenced living together in 1964 and have
held one another out as wife and husband since that time.

Lloyd

and Grayce did not enter into a formal marriage contract.

Lloyd

and Grayce filed joint Federal and State Income Tax returns
3

designating themselves as married and filing jointly (See Exhibits
1 and 2).

Lloyd and Grayce acquired a home in Kanab, Utah on the

6th day of June, 1985, designating themselves as husband and wife
and as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship (See Exhibit
4).
11).

The home was purchased for a total of $17,000.
Grayce

contributed

contributed

$2,000

accumulated:

(See Exhibit

$15,000 to the purchase

(Transcript

14).

Lloyd

and

and

Grayce

Lloyd
also

two shares of stock in the Kanab Irrigation Company

issued to Lloyd or Grayce Hurd (Exhibit 7) ; a travel trailer,
fifth-wheel type, Teton Brand 1978 model (See Exhibit 5); a travel
trailer 18 feet long, Kit Companion brand; a 1977 Chevrolet pickup
truck; 1980 Oldsmobile automobile; bank account at Zions First
National Bank, Kanab office, Account No. 052-50552-6, with account
balance of $20,420.85 (See Exhibit 24, Finding #9, R. 144).
On May 4, 1992, Lloyd was critically ill and dying of cancer.
Grayce took Lloyd to the Veterans Hospital in Salt Lake City for
treatment.

Grayce then stayed in the home of Lewellyn and Connie

while she was in Salt Lake.
Later Lloyd left the V.A. Hospital and also stayed at the home
of Lewellyn and Connie. On or about May 27 or May 28, 1992, it was
apparent that

"Lloyd was really getting bad."

He was in a

wheelchair and on oxygen (Tr. 35-L. 4 & 5).
Lloyd, Grayce, Connie and Lewellyn started discussing the need
to get all of the property out of the names of Grayce and Lloyd.
Grayce testified:

4

And all our things that was, everything, the vehicles and
everything was in both names had to be transferred out of
our names because if we put Lloyd in a rest-home, they
would - the State would take everything. (Tr. 36-L. 9-11)
The question was asked:

"who was saying there was a problem with

the property, with your owning property?"
by:

(Grayce)

"Connie and Lewellyn".

(Tr. 36-L. 14)

Answer

Grayce testified

"she

(Connie) said I would also lose my Social Security and everything
if everything wasn't deeded out of my name.
it, he said, yes it would."
Mom.

And Lewellyn okayed

Lewellyn also stated "that's true,

We got to look in his Social Security first and then get

everything out of your name."

(Tr. 37-L. 13)

The four parties then discussed the method of getting the
property out of the names of Lloyd and Grayce. Lewellyn called an
attorney and asked if he would come over to the home "to give
Lewellyn the power of attorney."

(Tr. 39-L. 3)

Grayce said

"Lloyd, if that's what you want, why, we would trust them with
that." (Tr. 39-L. 7-8)
Grayce continued: "Lloyd also talked to Lewellyn about it and
said 'I want to know that Grayce will be taken care of.'" Lewellyn
responded "I'll see she's taken care of" and he turned to me and
asked me "Mom, do you trust me? Do you trust me?" and he said that
several times and I said, "if I can't trust one of my children, who
can I trust?"

(Tr. 39-L. 15)

Attorney Keith Eddington came to the home with a prepared
general power of attorney and had it executed by Lloyd on the 29th
of May, 1992.

(See Exhibit 23)
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Eddington testified that he

explained to Lloyd and those present that the signing of the power
of attorney would permit "Lewellyn to do anything in his (Lloyd's)
behalf.

That he could transfer ownership to himself of all his

(Lloyd's) property, he could get his cash assets." (Tr. 107-L. 8).
Eddington testified "well, he (Lloyd) did want to give the power of
attorney to Lewellyn because he said he trusted him."

Eddington

further stated: "and he trusted Lewellyn with Grayce." (Tr. 108-L.
21)
Connie brought the power of attorney form to Eddington and
Eddington filled in the form in his own hand.

The following

testimony developed at trial:
Q.

(Olsen) Now, if he was going to give his property there
was no reason for any trust was there? Lewellyn could do
anything he wanted.

A.

That's true.

Q.

Now, if there was a trust relationship, did he tell you
what he wanted accomplished?

A.

Not in specifics.
He did make statements regarding
Lewellyn's concern for his mother and I gathered from
what he was saying it was more his financial position
than anything else...

Q.

Now from what you tell me, did you gather that Lloyd was
doing this, transferring the property to preserve it, to
see that his wife Grayce was taken care of?

A.

I believe that was part of it...

Q.

But then did he tell you that he trusted Lew?

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

A.

I think there was more concern about the State, quite
honestly, than the other kids. But that would have been
one of the concerns was that Grayce was taken care of.

Lloyd executed the power of attorney on the 29th of May, 1992
6

and died on the 3rd of June, 1992 (See death certificate - Exhibit
13) .
Kenneth

Lamb,

a

defense

witness

discussed

the

trust

relationship in the following examination:
By Mr. Olsen (Tr. 126)
Q.

Mr. Lamb, when you were talking with Lloyd Hurd did he
ever tell you why he needed to trust Lewellyn?

A.

All he told me was he couldn't trust any of the rest of
his family. I don't know what his reasons were.

Q.

But he said that he could trust Lewellyn?

A.

Lewellyn and his wife, yes.

Q.

So, apparently, he was trusting him to do something?

A.

I would think.

On Monday Grayce and Lewellyn went directly to the Kanab
branch of Zions Bank to make arrangements to take out the funds
from Account No. 052-50552-6.
On Tuesday, June 2, 1992 Lewellyn drew checks on the account.
Check 101 was made payable to himself as payee for $10,000 and
signed Lloyd I. Hurd, by Lewellyn Sherman. A second check numbered
102 was made payable to Connie Sherman for $10,000 and signed Lloyd
I. Hurd by Lewellyn Sherman.
presented with the checks.

A copy of the power of attorney was
An account was opened at the bank in

the name of Lewellyn Sherman and Connie Sherman with Lewellyn
Sherman's signature authorized. Both $10,000 checks were deposited
into the newly opened account.

(Tr. 168-L. 11-25)

They went from the bank to a title company.
have a quit-claim deed prepared.
7

Grayce paid to

(Tr. 46-L. 10)

Grayce and

Lewellyn signed the deed and offered

it for recording.

The

grantors on the deed were Lloyd I. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, husband
and wife with Lewellyn J. Sherman and Connie Sherman, husband and
wife as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship as grantees.
The deed was signed Lloyd I. Hurd by Lewellyn J. Sherman, his
attorney in fact and by Grayce Hurd, individually. (See Exhibit 21)
Grayce paid for the recording of the deed.

(Tr. 47-L. 10)

Grayce and Lewellyn then went to the Tax Commission Office in
Kanab where Grayce signed the titles to the 1977 Chevrolet pickup,
the

fifth-wheel

transferred.

and

the

18

foot

trailer.

The

titles were

Grayce paid all of the transfer fees. (Tr. 91-L. 8-

20)
The property transferred consisted of all the property owned
by Grayce Hurd and Lloyd I. Hurd.
The terms of Lewellyn's trust obligation to his mother were
ratified by Lewellyn in conversations between himself, his mother,
his sister Iris and his brother Paul.

Grayce talked to Lewellyn

shortly after Lloyd's funeral.
I said, well now that Lloyd isn't in the rest home or
anything, I said, let's turn everything back to me.
Lewellyn said, we'd better wait and see what your Social
Security is going to be. We will wait a year. ... (Tr.
52-L.9)
Grayce:
Well, we talked about it later and he said just wait a
year and then he'd turn everything back to me. ... After
the year was up, I said, "Well I've waited a year now.
How about turning that back to me and get my name." And
he said, ,f — I'm not giving you anything back until
you're — while your name is on Paul's truck because he
could have a wreck and you could lose everything we
have." (Tr. 52-L.17)
8

Immediately prior to Lloyd's funeral in Kanab on the 7th of
June, 1992, Paul had a conversation with Connie. Connie stated "If
anything happens to Lew, or Lew doesn't turn things back in your
mom's name, I'll make sure it gets back in her name."
L.16)

(Tr. 76-

Paul also heard one discussion between Lewellyn and Grayce

at the time of Lloyd's funeral:
Well Lewellyn was explaining to my mom about her Social
Security, losing that, and he would say; do you trust me?
Leave it in my name for a year and I will sign everything
back to you and within a year everything should be out of
danger of whatever he was trying to convince. (Tr. 77,
L. 20)
Later towards the end of 1992 a conversation was held between
Paul and Lewellyn in Richfield in June of 1992.
I told him mom's car was failing on her ... and he got
hot-headed and said "Paul, don't worry, I'll get things
back in mom's name" and left.
Iris Meir stated:
On June 8, her mother (Grayce) and her brother Lewellyn came
to her home. (Tr. 86-L. 21)

We set around the table out on the

patio and this is when they let me know what had taken place with
the property ... (Tr. 86-L. 23) He (Lewellyn) told me that Lloyd
had given him the power of attorney so it would be sure that my
mother had something to fall back on if something would happen to
him.

I told Lewellyn that was fine and I told my mother also, that

what they had done was fine with me because at the time Lewellyn
was the only one close to Salt Lake that was available to help with
the matter.

(Tr. 87-L. 2-6)

Iris Meir testified:
He said, Iris, I want to wait one year and make sure that
9

everything is settled down and okay and then this property, he
said, will be back in our mother's name so that she can run
her own affairs and not have to depend on anybody. (Tr. 87-L.
8-12)
Yes. Lewellyn told me, he said whenever Mom needs something,
I've got this check - he said I've got her money in this
special account and he had a checkbook. He said all I have to
do is write out a check for whatever she needs. I didn't get
a good look at the checkbook but that is what he told me. He
had a special account for my mother. (Tr. 90-L. 9-12)
Defendant Connie reaffirmed the testimony of her brother-inlaw Paul:

(Tr. 138-L. 18-22).

Q.

(Mr. Ludlow) Madam there's been some testimony about you
having some conversations with relatives after the
transferring of the property had occurred. First, as to
Paul Sherman, did you every have a conversation with him
about turning the property over?

A.

I did say that.
You know, I think that, I said if
anything happens to Lew, I didn't want to be a part of
it. I didn't.

Lewellyn has spent all of the $20,000 cash which was taken.
He was asked: (Tr. 175-L.16-17)
Q.

(Olsen) You have spent it all?

A.

Well, it has been spent for one thing or another, yes.

At the conclusion of the case the Court ruled Lewellyn was a
trustee of a constructive trust created for the benefit of his
mother (Grayce). The Decree, Judgment and Order required the home
be conveyed to the Plaintiff together with the two shares of
irrigation stock and the travel trailer, house trailer, 1977 Chev
pickup, and 1980 Oldsmobile automobile.
Judgment

for the $20,000 was awarded to Plaintiff

Defendants have disposed of the money.

10

since

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Grayce and Lloyd transferred all of the property, as well as
all of the funds they owned to Lewellyn and Connie.

The property

was transferred without consideration because Grayce and Lloyd were
told by Defendants they must get the property out of their names or
the State would take it from them. Defendants also advised Grayce
she could lose her Social Security if the property was held in her
name. Lloyd signed a power of attorney designating Lewellyn as his
attorney in fact and Lewellyn made the transfers. Grayce was able
to go with Lewellyn and make such assignments, deed executions and
did such other things as were necessary to transfer property
interests.
The execution and use of the power of attorney created a
principal-agent fiduciary relationship.

The mother and son and

daughter-in-law

a

relationship

created

presumption

of

a

confidential relationship. Therefore, the burden of proof was upon
the Defendants to show their actions were fair and equitable.
Defendants were obligated to hold the property for the benefit
of Lloyd and Grayce during his lifetime.

Upon Lloyds death, the

property was to be returned within one year to Grayce. Lloyd died
on the 3rd day of June, 1992 and to this date Defendants have
refused to return Plaintiff's property.
A constructive trust was found to exist because of the
fiduciary relationship. Defendants have not been able to marshall
evidence to impeach the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of the
District Court.
11

VI.
A.

ARGUMENTS

THE PLAINTIFF, 6RAYCE HURD, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF MR. HURD (LLOYD) CORRECTLY BROUGHT AND
MAINTAINED AN ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.
Appellants raise for the first time on appeal the question of

whether the plaintiff as a personal representative of the estate of
Lloyd is a real party in interest.

The basis for the argument is

that a formal marriage contract was not entered into between Grayce
and Lloyd and suggests that she must be found to be the "surviving
spouse" of Lloyd in order to have a real interest.

Section 75-3-

203(1)(d) is cited to support their argument.
The answer of Defendants filed in the matter admits the
appointment of Grayce as the Personal Representative of the estate
of Lloyd (See J 1 of Answer - R.12).
priority

among

as

Personal

Representative of an estate and has no application

in these

proceedings.

persons

Section 75-3-203 establishes

seeking

appointment

The appointment was made upon appropriate probate

petition and Letters Testamentary were issued to Grayce. There has
been no objection filed in the probate proceedings.

She is the

appointed and qualified person to marshall the assets of the estate
and to supervise the distribution of these assets to the heirs
entitled to such distribution.

Defendants (Lewellyn and Connie)

have no standing in this separate proceedings to challenge the
appointment.
A

person

is

not

disqualified

to

act

as

a

Personal

Representative merely because she claims property which is also
claimed by the estate.

(See Farnsworth v. Hatch, 47 Utah 62, 151
12

P.537 [1915]).
A personal representative has the obligation to "receive
assets from fiduciaries" (75-3-714[2]).

Therefore Grayce was

obligated to seek a court determination for the recovery of assets
held by Defendant and also to secure a determination as to the
division of those assets between herself and the estate of Lloyd
Hurd, deceased.
Since a District Court found a resulting trust wherein the
trustees held the assets for the benefit of Grayce, all of the
assets are required to be returned to her.
Considerable evidence was presented to the District Court
concerning the relationship of Grayce and Lloyd.

They were

together for a period of approximately thirty (30) years. However,
the purpose of the evidence was to show the relationship between
the parties, their joint investment and ownership of properties,
and

their

contributions

demonstrating

Lloyd's

to

the

interest

resulting
in

trust

designating

as

well

Grayce

as

as
a

beneficiary under the trust.
The foregoing issue is not only moot, it is also not material.
Further, it is not an issue raised in the pleadings nor was it
presented to the trial court.

The issue cannot be raised for the

first time on appeal (Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign Company,
[1978 Utah] 586 P.2d 416; Hanover Limited v. Fields 568 P.2d 75
[1977 Utah]).
B.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
HAD BEEN CREATED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF.
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy which arises by
13

operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment. Accordingly, parol
evidence may be introduced to establish a constructive trust,
Ashton v. Ashtonf 733 P.2D 147 (Utah 1987).
Ashton cites the following from the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §45 (1957):
Effect of Failure of Oral Trust for a Third Person
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it
inter vivos to another in trust for a third person, but
no memorandum properly evidencing the intention to create
a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of Frauds,
and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the
transferee holds the interest upon a constructive trust
for the third person, if, but only if,

(b) The transferee at the time of the transfer was in a
confidential relation to the transferor.
It

follows

that

in order

to

find

a constructive

trust

existing, the lower court found a confidential relationship.
The Wyoming case of Fuller v. Fuller, 606 P.2d 306 addressed
this situation and stated:
We have held that a trust is an obligation arising out of
a confidence reposed in a person to apply property
faithfully.
(Citations omitted) We have said that a
trust - in its technical sense is an obligation of a
person arising out of a confidence reposed in him to
apply property faithfully and according to such
confidence.
A trust, is a fiduciary relationship in
which one person is the holder of titled property subject
to an equitable obligation to keep or use property for
the benefit of another.
In Ashton the Supreme Court of Utah made similar observations,
at page 151:
In Parks, we described an express trust as a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, arising as a
result of a manifestation of intent to create it and

14

subjecting the person in whom title is vested to
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of
others.
A

confidential

Lewellyn

relationship

and daughter-in-law

Complaint.

The

District

between

Grayce

Connie was plead

Court

found

the

and

her

son

in Plaintiff's

parent

and

child

relationship between the parties which shifted the burden of proof.
See record 145 and 146 - Findings 1, 2 and 3.
In Baker v. Pattee. Utah Supreme Court (1984) 684 P.2d 632 it
was held:
A confidential relationship is presumed between parent
and child, attorney and client and trustee and cestui que
trust. Blodaett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978)
Baker also held:
Where a confidential relationship exists, a presumption
of unfairness arises which must be overcome by
countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the
Defendant to prove absence of unfairness by a
preponderance of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbe11,
674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1993) ...
The

District

Court

after

hearing

all

of

the

evidence

determined a trust did exist and Lewellyn agreed:
I'll keep all of the property for a year. Mom can apply
for Social Security. If nobody says anything for a year,
then we should be safe and I'll give all the property
back to her. In the meantime, she can continue living in
the house. (R. 141)
Findings of Fact 33 and 34 of the District Court (R. 138)
were:
33.
More
death.

than one year had passed since Lloyd's

34. No claims had been made by Social Security, Veteran's
Administration or any other Medicare or long-term provider.
Based

upon these

findings the Court made
15

the

following

Conclusions of Law:
1.

A constructive trust was created for the benefit of the
Plaintiff. (R. 138)

Not only did Defendant have the obligation of meeting the
shifted burden of proof because of the confidential relationship,
the evidence as to the trust was convincing. Attention is invited
to Appellee's Statement of Facts and the Findings and Conclusions
of the lower court. It is impressive to observe summary statements
of the witnesses.
Plaintiff's witnesses stated:
1.

Gravce Hurd testified as to the discussions leading to
the transfer of the property and that all of the property
owned by herself and Lloyd was transferred to Lewellyn
and Connie without consideration.
Grayce paid all
expenses in making the transfers.
She further testified concerning the representations of
Lewellyn in accepting the trust that he would hold the
property for her benefit and transfer it back to her
after a year.

2.

Iris Meir (sister of Lewellyn) stated Lewellyn said: I
want to wait one year and make sure that everything is
settled down and okay and then this property will be back
in Mother's name so that she can run her own affairs and
not have to be dependent on anybody (Tr. 87-L. 8-12).
Also, I've got her money in this special account and all
I have to do is write out a check for whatever she needs.

3.

Paul
Sherman
(Lewellyn's
brother)
had
several
conversations with Lewellyn in which Lewellyn ratified
his trust responsibility. He was told "Paul don't worry,
I'll get things back in Mom's name." ... And
I will sign everything back to her within a year.
Everything should be out of danger ...
Statement by Connie to Paul on the day of Lloyd's funeral
(7th of June, 1992): Connie said:
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If anything happens to Lew, or Lew doesn't turn
things back in your Mom's name, I'll make sure it
gets back in her name.
Defendant's witnesses all agreed that there was a trust
relationship between the parties.
1.

Keith Eddinaton stated:
Well he (Lloyd) did want to give the power of
attorney to Lewellyn because he said he trusted
him.

Q.

Now if it was a trust relationship, did he tell you what
he wanted accomplished?

A.

Not in specifics.
He did make statements regarding
Lewellyn's concern for his mother and I gathered from
what he was saying it was more his financial position
than anyone else ...

He also stated:
But that would have been one of his concerns was
Grayce was taken care of.
2.

Kenneth Lamb acknowledged that Lloyd trusted Lewellyn and

his wife and that he was therefor trusting Lewellyn to do something
(Tr. 126).
3.

Defendant Lewellyn.

He planned to allow his mother to

continue residing in the home.

(Tr. 164 - L. 11-13).

He transferred back to his mother a trailer.
4.

Defendant Connie acknowledged she had told her brother-

in-law Paul Sherman that, "If anything happens to Lew, or if Lew
doesn't turn things back to your mom's name, I'll make sure it gets
back in her name." (Tr. 76-L. 16-19)

She said "I did say that."

(Tr. 138-L. 21)
The evidence outlined is not only substantial but mandated a
finding of a constructive trust.
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C.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
CORRECTLY
FOUND
THERE
WAS
NO
CONSIDERATION FOR THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED, MONEY TRANSFERS,
OR VEHICLE TRANSFERS.
The trial court made Finding 25:
Neither Lewellyn nor Connie paid money for, nor
transferred anything of value to Grayce in exchange (for)
the quit-claim deed, the checks or the vehicles titles.
Grayce's paid for: attorney Eddington's services in preparing

the power of attorney.

(See Tr. 40-L. 12 # Cost $50.00);

the deed by the title company, cost $10.00.

preparing

(Tr. 46-L. 9 ) ; the

recording of the quit-claim deed (Tr. 47-L. 1 0 ) ; the transfer of
motor vehicle titles and new license costs (Tr. 51-L. 2 0 ) .
Lewellyn and Connie paid nothing to Grayce or to Lloyd and
offered

no

evidence

of

consideration.

In

Baker,

supra

the

following appears at page 634:
This Court will disturb the Findings of Fact in equity
cases only where the evidence clearly preponderates
against them.
Brown v. Love1and, Utah, 678 P.2d 292
(1984); Del Porto v. Nicolo. 27 Utah 2nd 286, 495 P.2d
811 (1972); First Security Bank of Utah NA v. Hall. 29
Utah 2nd 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1992). We are not bound to
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, and
because of its advantaged position, we give considerable
deference to Findings and Judgment.
Gillmore v.
Gillmore. Utah, 657 P.2d 736 (1982); Jensen v. Brown.
Utah 639 P.2d 150 (1981); Paaano v. Walker. Utah 539 P.2d
452 (1975).
Appellant does argue consideration was either given or it was
not necessary since the transfers were gifts.
A review of the evidence demonstrates that gifts were not
intended.

The property was to be held in trust for the benefit of

Lloyd and Grayce during his lifetime.
Grayce was the sole beneficiary.

Upon the death of Lloyd,

The self-serving notation written

by Lewellyn on the checks did not change the demonstrated intent of
18

the parties.
The District Court was not persuaded Grayce had received
adequate consideration because she was permitted to live in her own
home.

Her continued possession supported her testimony that she

was the equitable owner of the home.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ALL OP THE
PROPERTY SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RETURNED.
All of the worldly possessions accumulated by Grayce and Lloyd

were held in trust by Lewellyn and Connie.

Grayce had been

attempting to secure the needed return of the property since the
year of 1993.

Lewellyn had not returned the property and had

exhausted all of the cash reserve transferred to him. The terms of
the trust had been met and Lewellyn kept imposing unreasonable
delays.

Equity and justice required the immediate return of the

property.
1.

A Life Estate Was Not Created.

Appellants ignore the overwhelming evidence as to the terms of
the trust and argue the terms were different than found by the
District Court. Appellants argue Grayce had only a life estate in
the assets and therefore legal title must continue to be held for
Lewellyn/s benefit as a remainderman.
The argument places a strained interpretation on the evidence
offered in the District Court and is contrary to the Findings of
the Court. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held Findings of
a lower Court will not be disturbed when supported by reasonable
and competent evidence.

See Baker v. Pattee, supra.
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2.

The Severance of the Joint Tenancy

Appellant argues a joint tenancy is terminated by conveyance
and for that reason grantees receive unimpeachable title.

We

believe the argument is without merit.
While the grantees hold legal title to property in question,
the equitable title is held by Grayce and she has the right to have
the trust terminated.
A constructive trust was imposed because of the breach of a
fiduciary

relationship.

The trustees refused

to return the

property which in equity and good conscience must be returned.
Retention of the property by Lewellyn would result in his unjust
enrichment.
In this case Appellants retain title to the mother's property
through an abuse of confidence.

The trust should be immediately

distributed to the equitable owner.
E.

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIMS.
Plaintiff's Complaint (R-9-5) does state a cause of action

which resulted because of a breach of a confidential relationship.
The District Court found a constructive trust existed between the
parties. The decision further ordered all of the property returned
to Grayce since she is the beneficiary under the trust.
1.

Evidence Supporting Plaintiff's Claim of Confidential
Relationship.

The sufficiency of the evidence has been demonstrated in the
Statement of Facts and argued under each of the proceeding points
of argument.
20

Again it should be noted that constructive trusts result
because of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 1 §155, page 210 states:
Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose
of working out right and justice, where there was no
intention of the parties to create such a relationship
•• •

If one party obtains legal title to property ... in any
... unconscientious manner, so that he cannot equitably
retain the property which really belongs to another,
equity carries out its theory of a double ownership,
equity and legal, by impressing a constructive trust upon
the property in favor of the one who is in good
conscience entitled to it, and who is considered in
equity as the beneficial owner ...
In Scott on Trusts 2317, §462.2 it is stated:
A constructive trust, as I have said, is imposed in order
to prevent unjust enrichment. This unjust enrichment may
rise out of a wrongful acquisition of the title to
property ... A constructive trust may arise, however,
even though the acquisition of the property was not
wrongful. It arises where the retention of the property
would result in the unjust enrichment of the person
retaining it. So it is said that to establish such a
trust it is not necessary to show intentional fraud.
Tate v. Emery. 139 Or. 214, 9 P.2d 136. Teuscher v.
Gragg, 136 Ok. 129, 276 P 735, 66 ALR 143; Ryan v. Plath,
18 Wa. 2d 839, 140 P.2d 968; Cook v. Elmore. 27 Wyo. 163,
192 P 824. [Emphasis added.]
In

addition

to

the

foregoing

reasons

for

constructive trust when a fiduciary has violated

declaring

a

a trust of

confidence, this Court has made a specific determination concerning
relationships where a fudiciary relationship

is presumed.

A

confidential relationship is presumed between parent and child (See
Baker v. Pattee. supra).
The fiduciary relationship existing between the parties was
further demonstrated by the execution of the power of attorney and
the acceptance and use of that power of attorney by Lewellyn. The
21

Kansas Supreme Court in Kline v. Orebaugh, 519 P.2d 691 (Kan. 1974)
was confronted with facts similar to those in this case.
had executed a power of attorney to their son.

Parents

The resulting

principal and agent fiduciary relationship was considered.

The

Court determined a confidential relationship existing between the
parties.

The Court at page 695 stated:

[1-5] At the outset it would be helpful to review some of
the basic rights and obligations which came into
existence when W.D. and Minnie B. Orebaugh executed their
powers of attorney to their son, Roy. The relation of
principal and agent is a fiduciary one, and if a wrong
arises because of the conduct of the agent the same
remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the
principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of
the cestui
que trust.
fWolcott & Lincoln, Inc. v Butler,
155 Kan 105, 122 P.2d 720.) In this case Roy Orebaugh
having obtained a power of attorney from each of his
parents was their agent. There existed a confidential
relation between them. The execution of the powers of
attorney was induced by that relation and Roy Orebaugh
violated the confidence reposed in him by his parents.
2.

Evidence Does Support Plaintiff's Claim of Constructive
Fraud.

Appellant cites the elements required for a Finding of common
law fraud and argues Plaintiff's burden of proof has not been met
in the District Court.
The argument is without merit.

A fiduciary and confidential

relationship existed between the parties and a constructive trust
was imposed.

Plaintiff transferred to a son and daughter-in-law,

without consideration, all of their assets for a specific purpose.
The term of the trust (or purpose) had been met and the trustees
have refused to return the property.
In addition to the general evidence creating the trust, the
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District Court considered the breached confidential relationship
created by the parents trust of a child, the fiduciary relationship
created by execution of a power of attorney and the transfer of all
of their property to the child without consideration.
relationship

shifted

the

burden

of

proof

and

The trust

required

the

Defendants to show fairness. The Defendants were not able to show
they were equitable and fair. Therefore, the District Court found
a constructive trust.
As noted under other headings of this Brief, the evidence
mandated the result reached by the District Court. The Appellants
have not been able to marshall evidence to the contrary.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Grayce and Lloyd conveyed all of their worldly possessions in
trust to Lewellyn and Connie for protection against imagined
problems. The "problems" were brought to their attention by Connie
and by Lewellyn. Lewellyn recommended the problems would be solved
by Defendants holding title to all property for a period of one
year after Lloyd's death. Lloyd wanted to protect the property for
himself and Grayce and for Grayce in the event of his death.

No

consideration was paid by Lewellyn and Connie for the transfer of
the property. Grayce paid all of the costs for.property transfers.
Under the developed facts, the trial court correctly determined a
constructive trust existed and Grayce was the beneficiary.
Equity and good conscience require the termination of the
constructive

trust

and

the

return

beneficiary.
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of

the

property

to

the

We respectfully submit the Decree, Judgment and Order of the
District Court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 1st day of July, 1997.
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN
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TE3t K. OLSEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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